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Abstract
The consistency formula for set theory can be stated in
terms of the free-variables theory of primitive recursive maps.
Free-variable p. r. predicates are decidable by set theory, main
result here, built on recursive evaluation of p. r. map codes and
soundness of that evaluation in set theoretical frame: internal
p. r. map code equality is evaluated into set theoretical equal-
ity. So the free-variable consistency predicate of set theory is
decided by set theory, ω-consistency assumed. By Go¨del’s sec-
ond incompleteness theorem on undecidability of set theory’s
consistency formula by set theory under assumption of this ω-
consistency, classical set theory turns out to be ω-inconsistent.
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1 Primitive recursive maps
Define the theory PR of objects and p. r. maps as follows re-
cursively as a subsystem of set theory T :
• the objects
1 = {0},N,N ×N, . . . , A, . . . , B,A×B etc.
• the map constants
0 : 1→ N (zero), s = s(n) = n+1 (successor), idA : A→
A (identities), Π : A → 1 (terminal maps), l = l(a, b) =
a : A × B → A, r = r(a, b) = b : A × B → B (left and
right projections);
• closure against (associative) map composition,
g ◦ f = (g ◦ f)(a) = g(f(a)) : A→ B → C;
• closure against forming the induced map (f, g) = (f, g)(c) =
(f(c), g(c)) : C → A × B into a product, for given com-
ponents f : C → A, g : C → B,
l ◦ (f, g) = f, r ◦ (f, g) = g;
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• closure against forming the iterated map
f § = f §(a, n) = fn(a) : A×N→ A,
f0(a) = idA(a) = a,
f sn(a) = f §(a, sn) = (f ◦ f §)(a, n) = f(fn(a, n)).
Furthermore PR is to inherit from T uniqueness of the ini-
tialised iterated, in order to inherit uniqueness in the following
full schema of primitive recursion:
g = g(a) : A→ B (initialisation),
h = h((a, n), b) : (A×N)×B → B (step)
(pr)
f = f(a, n) : A×N→ B,
f(a, 0) = g(a)
f(a, sn) = h((a, n), f(a))
+uniqueness of such p. r. defined map f.
This schema allows in particular construction of for loops,
for i := 1 to n do. . .od
as for verification if a given text (code) is an (arithmetised)
proof of a given coded assertion, Go¨del’s p. r. formula 45. xBy,
x ist Beweis von y.
(Formel 46.Bew y = ∃xBy, x is provable, is not p. r.)
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2 PR code sets and evaluation
The map code set—set of go¨del numbers—we want to evaluate
is PR =
⋃
A,B[A,B] ⊂ N in T, [A,B] = [A,B]PR the set of
p. r. map codes from A to B.
Together with evaluation on suitable arguments it is recur-
sively defined as follows:
• Basic map constants ba in PR :
– p0q ∈ [1,N] ⊂ PR (zero),
ev(p0q, 0) = 0,
psq ∈ [N,N] (successor),
ev(psq, n) = s(n) = n+ 1,
– For an object A pidAq ∈ [A,A] (identity),
ev(pidAq, a) = idA(a) = a,
pΠAq ∈ [A,1] (terminal map),
ev(pΠAq, a) = ΠA(a) = 0.
– for objects A,B plA,Bq ∈ [A×B,A] (left projection),
ev(plA,B , (a, b)q = lA,B(a, b) = a,
prA,Bq ∈ [A×B,B] (right projection),
ev(prA,B , (a, b)q = rA,B(a, b) = b.
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• For u ∈ [A,B], v ∈ [B,C] : v ⊙ u ∈ [A,C]
(internal composition),
ev(v ⊙ u, a) = ev(v, ev(u, a)).
• For u ∈ [C,A], v ∈ [C,B] : 〈u; v〉 ∈ [C,A ×B]
(induced map code into a product),
ev(〈u; v〉, c) = (ev(u, c), ev (v, c)).
• For u ∈ [A,A] : u$ ∈ [A×N, A] (iterated map code),
ev(u$, 0) = idA(a) = a,
ev(u$, sn) = ev(u, ev(u$, n)) (double recursion)
This recursion terminates in set theory T, with correct
results:
Objectivity Theorem: Evaluation ev is objective, i. e. for
f : A→ B in PR we have
ev(pfq, a) = f(a).
Proof by substitution of codes of PR maps into code vari-
ables u, v ∈ PR ⊂ N in the above double recursive definition
of evaluation, in particular:
• composition
ev(pgq ⊙ pfq, a) = ev(pgq, ev (pfq, a)),
= g(f(a)) = (g ◦ f)(a)
recursively, and
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• iteration
ev(pfq$, 〈a; sn〉) = ev(pfq, ev(pfq$, 〈a;n〉))
= f(f §(a, n)) = f(fn(a)) = f sn(a)
recursively.
3 PR soundness within set theory
Notion f =PR g of p. r. maps is externally p. r. enumerated, by
complexity of (binary) deduction trees.
Internalising—formalising—gives an internal notion of PR
equality,
u =ˇk v ∈ PR× PR
coming by kth internal equation proved by kth internal deduc-
tion tree dtreek.
PR evaluation soundness theorem framed by set
theory T : For p. r. theory PR with its internal notion of
equality ‘=ˇ’ we have:
(i) PR to T evaluation soundness:
T ⊢ u =ˇ v =⇒ ev(u, x) = ev(v, x) (•)
Substituting in the above “concrete” PR codes into u
resp. v, we get, by objectivity of evaluation ev :
(ii) T-framed objective soundness of PR :
For p. r.maps f, g : A→ B
T ⊢ pfq =ˇ pgq =⇒ f(a) = g(a).
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(iii) Specialising to case f : = χ : A → 2 = {0, 1} a p. r.
predicate, and to g : = true, we get
T-framed logical soundness of PR :
T ⊢ ∃kProvPR(k, pχq) =⇒ ∀xχ(x) :
If a p. r. predicate is—within T—PR-internally prov-
able, then it holds in T for all of its arguments.
Proof by primitive recursion on k, dtreek the k th deduc-
tion tree of the theory, proving its root equation u =ˇk v. These
(argument-free) deduction trees are counted in lexicographical
order.
Super Case of equational internal axioms, in particular
• associativity of (internal) composition:
〈〈w ⊙ v〉 ⊙ u〉 =ˇ 〈w ⊙ 〈v ⊙ u〉〉 =⇒
ev (〈w ⊙ v〉 ⊙ u, a) = ev (〈w ⊙ v〉, ev (u, a))
= ev (w, ev (v, ev (u, a)))
= ev (w, ev (〈v ⊙ u〉, a)) = ev (w ⊙ 〈v ⊙ u〉, a).
This proves assertion (•) in present associativity-of-composition
case.
• Analogous proof for the other flat, equational cases, namely
reflexivity of equality, left and right neutrality of iden-
tities, all substitution equations for the map constants,
Godement’s equations for the induced map:
l ⊙ 〈u; v〉 =ˇ u, r ⊙ 〈u; v〉 =ˇ v,
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as well as surjective pairing
〈l ⊙ w; r ⊙ w〉 =ˇw
and distributivity equation
〈u; v〉 ⊙ w =ˇ 〈u⊙ w; v ⊙ w〉
for composition with an induced.
• proof of (•) for the last equational case, the
Iteration step, case of genuine iteration equation
u$⊙〈pidq#psq =ˇ u⊙u$〉, # the internal cartesian product
of map codes:
T ⊢ ev (u$ ⊙ 〈pidq#psq〉, 〈a;n〉) (1)
= ev (u$, ev(〈pidq#psq〉, 〈a;n〉))
= ev (u$, 〈a; sn〉)
= ev (u, ev(u$, 〈a;n〉)
= ev (u⊙ u$, 〈a;n〉). (2)
Proof of termination-conditioned inner soundness for the
remaining genuine Horn case axioms, of form
u =ˇi v ∧ u
′ =ˇj v
′ =⇒ w =ˇk w
′, i, j < k :
Transitivity-of-equality case
u =ˇi v ∧ v =ˇj w =⇒ u =ˇk w :
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Evaluate at argument a ∈ A and get in fact
T ⊢ u =ˇk w
=⇒ ev(u, a) = ev(v, a) ∧ ev(v, a) = ev(w, a)
(by hypothesis on u, v)
=⇒ ev(u, a) = ev(w, a) :
transitivity export q. e. d. in this case.
Compatibility case of composition with equality,
u =ˇu′ =⇒ 〈v ⊙ u〉 =ˇ 〈v ⊙ u′〉 :
ev(v ⊙ u, a) = ev(v, ev (u, a)) = ev(v, ev (u′, a))
= ev(v ⊙ u′, x),
by hypothesis on u =ˇu′ and by Leibniz’ substitutivity in T,
q. e. d. in this first compatibility case.
Case of composition with equality in second composition
factor,
v =ˇi v
′ =⇒ 〈v ⊙ u〉 =ˇk 〈v
′ ⊙ u〉 :
ev(〈v ⊙ u〉, x) = ev(v, ev (u, x)) = ev(v′, ev(u, x)) (∗)
= ev(〈v′ ⊙ u〉, x).
(∗) holds by v =ˇ v′, induction hypothesis on v, v′, and Leibniz’
substitutivity: same argument put into equal maps.
This proves soundness assertion (•) in this 2nd compatibil-
ity case.
(Redundant) Case of compatibility of forming the in-
duced map, with equality, is analogous to compatibilities above,
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even easier, since the two map codes concerned are independent
from each other what concerns their domains.
(Final) Case of Freyd’s (internal) uniqueness of the ini-
tialised iterated, is case
〈w ⊙ 〈pidq; p0q ⊙ pΠq〉 =ˇi u〉
∧ 〈w ⊙ 〈pidq#psq〉 =ˇj 〈v ⊙ w〉〉
=⇒ w =ˇk v
$ ⊙ 〈u#pidq〉
Comment: w is here an internal comparison candidate fullfill-
ing the same internal p. r. equations as the initialised iterated
〈v$⊙〈u#pidq〉〉. It should be – is: soundness – evaluated equal
to the latter, on A×N.
Soundness assertion (•) for the present Freyd’s uniqueness
case recurs on =ˇi, =ˇj turned into predicative equations ‘=’,
these being already deduced, by hypothesis on i, j < k. Further
ingredients are transitivity of ‘=’ and established properties of
evaluation ev .
So here is the remaining – inductive – proof, prepared by
T ⊢ ev(w, 〈a; 0〉) = ev(u; a) (0¯)
as well as
ev(w, 〈a; sn〉) = ev (w ⊙ 〈pidq#psq〉, 〈a;n〉)
= ev (v ⊙ w, 〈a;n〉), (s¯)
the same being true for w′ : = v$⊙〈u#pidq〉 in place of w, once
more by (characteristic) double recursive equations for ev , this
time with respect to the initialised internal iterated itself.
10
(0¯) and (s¯) put together for both then show, by induction
on iteration count n ∈ N—all other free variables u, v, w, a to-
gether form the passive parameter for this induction—soundness
assertion (•) for this Freyd’s uniqueness case, namely
T ⊢ ev (w, 〈a;n〉) = ev (v$ ⊙ 〈u#pidq〉, 〈a;n〉).
Induction runs as follows:
Anchor n = 0 :
ev (w, 〈a; 0〉) = ev (u, a) = ev (w′, 〈a; 0〉),
step:
ev(w, 〈a;n〉) = ev(w′, 〈a;n〉) =⇒
ev (w, 〈a; sn〉) = ev(v, ev(w, 〈a;n〉))
= ev(v, ev (w′, 〈a;n〉)) = ev(w′, 〈a; sn〉),
q. e. d.
4 PR-predicate decision
We consider here PR predicates for decidability by set theo-
rie(s) T. Basic tool is T-framed soundness of PR just above,
namely
χ = χ(a) : A→ 2 PR predicate
T ⊢ ∃kProvPR(k, pχq) =⇒ ∀aχ(a).
11
Within T define for χ : A→ 2 out of PR a partially defined
(alleged, individual) µ-recursive decision ∇χ : 1 ⇀ 2 by first
fixing decision domain
D = Dχ : = {k ∈ N : ¬χ(ctA(k)) ∨ ProvPR(k, pχq)},
ctA : N → A (retractive) Cantor count of A; and then, with
(partial) recursive µD : 1⇀ N within T :
∇χ =def


false if ¬χ(ctA(µD))
(counterexample),
true if ProvPR(µD, pχq)
(internal proof),
⊥ (undefined) otherwise, i. e.
if ∀aχ(a) ∧ ∀k¬ProvPR(k, pχq).
[ This (alleged) decision is apparently µ-recursive within T,
even if apriori only partially defined.]
There is a first consistency problem with this definition:
are the defined cases disjoint?
Yes, within frame theory T which soundly frames theory
PR :
T ⊢ (∃ k ∈ N) ProvPR(k, pχq) =⇒ ∀aχ(a).
We show now, that decision ∇χ is totally defined, the undefined
case does not arise, this for T ω-consistent in Go¨del’s sense.
We have the following complete – metamathematical – case
distinction on D = Dχ ⊆ N :
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• 1st case, termination: D has at least one (“total”) PR
point 1→ D ⊆ N, and hence
t = t∇χ = by def µD = minD : 1→ D
is a (total) p. r. point.
Subcases:
– 1.1, negative (total) subcase:
¬χctA(t) = true.
[ Then T ⊢ ∇χ = false.]
– 1.2, positive (total) subcase:
ProvPR(t, pχq) = true.
[ Then T ⊢ ∇χ = true,
by T-framed objective soundness of PR.]
These two subcases are disjoint, disjoint here by
T-framed soundness of theory PR which reads
T ⊢ ProvPR(k, pχq) =⇒ ∀aχ(a), k free,
here in particular – substitute t : 1→ N into k free:
πR ⊢ ProvPR(t, pχq) =⇒ ∀aχ(a).
So furthermore, by this framed soundness, in present
subcase:
T ⊢ ∀aχ(a) ∧ ProvPR(t, pχq). (•)
• 2nd case, derived non-termination:
T ⊢ D = ∅ ≡ {N : false
N
} ⊂ N
[ then in particular T ⊢ ∀a¬χ(a) = false,
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so T ⊢ ∀aχ(a) in this case ],
and furthermore
T ⊢ ∀k¬ProvPR(k, pχq), so
T ⊢ ∀aχ(a) ∧ ∀k¬ProvPR(k, pχq) (∗)
in this case.
• 3rd, remaining, ill case is:
D (metamathematically) has no (total) points 1 → D,
but is nevertheless not empty.
Take in the above the (disjoint) union of 2nd subcase of
1st case, (•), and of 2nd case, (∗), as new case. And formalise
last, remaining case. Arrive at the following
Quasi-Decidability Theorem: each p. r. predicate χ :
A→ 2 gives rise within set theory T to the following complete
(metamathematical) case distinction:
(a) T ⊢ ∀aχ(a) or else
(b) T ⊢ ¬χctAt : 1→ Dχ → 2
(defined counterexample), or else
(c) D = Dχ non-empty, pointless, formally: in this case we
would have within T :
T ⊢ ∃ aˆ ∈ D,
and “nevertheless” for each p. r. point p : 1→ N
T ⊢ p 6∈ D.
We rule out the latter – general – possibility of a non-
empty predicate without p. r. points, for frame theory T by
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go¨delian assumption of ω-consistency. In fact it rules out
above instance of ω-inconsistency: all numerals 0, 1, 2, . . . are
p. r. points. Hence it rules out – in quasi-decidability above –
possibility (c) for decision domain D = Dχ ⊆ N of decision
operator ∇ for predicate χ : A→ 2, and we get
Decidability theorem: Each free-variable p. r. predicate
χ : A→ 2 gives rise to the following complete case distinc-
tion by set theory T :
Under assumption of ω-consistency for T :
• T ⊢ ∀aχ(a) (theorem) or
• T ⊢ (∃ a ∈ A)¬χ(a). (counterexample)
Now take here for predicate χ, T’s own free-variable p. r. con-
sistency formula
ConT = ¬ProvT(k, pfalseq) : N→ 2,
and get, under assumption of ω-consistency for T, a consis-
tency decision ∇ConT for T by T.
This contradiction to (the postcedent of) Go¨del’s 2nd In-
completeness theorem shows that the assumption of ω-consistency
for set theories T must fail:
Set theories T are ω-inconsistent.
This concerns all classical set theories as in particular PM, ZF,
and NGB. The reason is ubiquity of formal quantification
within these (arithmetical) theories.
Problem: Does it concern Peano Arithmetic either?
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